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By Democratic Audit UK
Political parties have a key role in addressing climate change,
but their responses to date have been constrained
Talks in Lima this weekend produced a global plan to tackle climate change in advance of next year’s Paris
summit. Despite these periodic returns to the political agenda, parties in the UK continue to show varying degrees
of interest and afford the issue differing levels of priority. Here, Conor Little discusses a project which looks at
European parties responses to the issue, and argues that while parties do have a decisive role in addressing
global warming, their responses are constrained by a number of factors. 
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report, recently completed with the
publication of its Synthesis Report, highlighted a number of political implications of climate change, including
increased civil war and inter-group violence due the exacerbation of the causes of those conflicts, increased
poverty and migration and, potentially, increased rivalry between states. The reality and prospect of climate
change will also have – indeed, is already having – an impact on the domestic politics of liberal democracies, at
the centre of which are political parties.
The ESRC-funded Climate Policy and Political Parties (CPPP) project aims to describe the responses of
mainstream political parties to the emergence of climate change as a major policy issue in several EU member
states, and to identify the constraints and incentives that have shaped those responses. Although climate change
is a global issue, we suggest that there are a number of reasons why parties’ responses to this issue at the
national level are important.
First, parties’ positions influence government policy on climate change. We know this because of a growing set of
systematic comparative studies and in-depth case studies that examine shifts in government policy that have
followed changes in the partisan composition of government. Policy change that followed the centre-right National
Party’s success in New Zealand in 2008 is one instance of this. At the international level, many of the leaders who
attend global summits on climate change are representatives not only of governments, but also of political parties,
and this is reflected in the negotiating positions that they take and in their ratification of international environmental
agreements.
The second reason for studying parties’ positions on climate policy is their importance for the public’s attitudes and
behaviour, which in turn matters for climate change policy outcomes. Greenhouse gas emissions are not just a
result of government policy or, indeed, of the policies of ‘big business’. They also result from consumer behaviour:
how we consume (which modes of transport, which foods, which energy sources) and how much we consume.
We know from studies of public opinion on climate change and on other issues, such as EU integration, that
parties don’t just follow public opinion; they also lead and shape it. Moreover, as governors and prospective
governors, parties may provide certainty (or uncertainty) regarding future government policy, which in turn informs
investors’ decisions.
Third, parties influence one another, shaping the ‘menu’ that is presented to voters at election time. In the years
before the UK general election in 2010, for example, Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats aimed
to outdo one another on climate policy.
Fourth, political parties matter because of the dual role that they play in modern democracies as governors and
representatives. If policy change of the scale recommended by the IPPC WG III contribution to this year’s Fifth
Assessment Report is to take place, parties will play an essential role in representing citizens’ interests in these
processes of change and in communicating the reasons for these policy changes to citizens. Parties will continue
to be indispensable for democracy in a period of far-reaching policy change.
Research carried out to date by the CPPP project has found that mainstream political parties have been
constrained by a number of factors from devoting significant attention to climate change and developing strong
policy positions on climate change mitigation. In an initial paper focusing on the two largest parties in Denmark,
Italy, and the UK, we have measured the proportion of election manifesto content that indicates support for policies
that would, if implemented, mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Figure 1 shows that while mainstream parties
have occasionally devoted substantial attention to climate change mitigation policies in recent years, these
episodes have been the exception rather than the rule.
In the Danish centre-right and centre-left and in the Italian centre-left Partito Democratico (PD), increased attention
to climate policy in 2007 and 2008, respectively, has not been sustained through the economic crisis, while in the
UK it seems that something similar has occurred since the 2010 general election, with climate policy falling down
the main parties’ agendas in recent years.
Figure 1) Pro-climate policy content in party manifestos, 2001-present
 This graph is based on draft data, which is presented in a recent paper by Neil Carter, Robert Ladrech and Conor
Little. The paper provides more details on the data and findings reported in this blog post.
From case study research that involved speaking with key individuals in parties and in environmental NGOs,
business representative organisations and trade unions, and from studying the events surrounding these
elections, we have identified a number of constraints that may help to explain their typically weak positions on
climate change.
Some of these relate to these parties’ need to compete for votes. Although public demand for climate policy varies
between countries (it has been higher in Denmark than Italy, for instance) and over time, it is generally true that
public concern about climate change and public demand for a political response to climate change has been
relatively low. Moreover, while climate policy has typically been assimilated into the left-right pattern of electoral
competition that characterises these countries’ politics, it has not typically been adopted as a high priority by either
voters or parties on the centre-left or the centre-right.
An important obstacle to several of these parties developing a strong climate policy response, however, appears to
have its origins inside the parties. Internal party groups on the centre-right and the centre-left have constrained
their parties from developing their climate policies further. For example, Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right parties
have hosted a vocal and active constituency that rejects the science of climate change and actively opposes
climate policy, while the UK Conservatives also host a climate-sceptical wing. Internal constraints work together
with external interests: important factions within the Italian centre-left, for instance, have strong links to the
formerly state-owned energy companies, which have invested heavily in fossil fuel-based energy production.
When climate policy has been given higher priority by these parties, it has resulted from a range of factors. A need
to ‘modernise’ parties’ images in the face of poor electoral performances drove policy change in the Italian centre-
left in 2008 and in Cameron’s Conservatives in the lead-in to the 2010 election. Where important business
interests have seen opportunities rather than threats in the development of green industries (e.g., in Denmark),
this appears to have had a significant effect on party policies. And the role of influential individuals with an
opportunity to drive policy change and a personal commitment to climate policy should not be discounted. They
have included David Miliband in Labour, Connie Hedegaard in the Danish centre-right (albeit from outside the
main centre-right party Venstre) and Walter Veltroni in the Italian PD.
Finally, the ebb and flow of attention to climate change by political parties has corresponded with external events.
Interest in climate policy hit a peak in the late 2000s, with the publication of the Stern Report and the release of Al
Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth in 2006, the publication of the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC published in
2007 and the lead-in to the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009. These events influenced
public opinion, which in turn provided an incentive for political parties to develop their positions on climate change
mitigation. Conversely, with the failure of the Copenhagen Climate Conference and with the onset of the economic
crisis, the salience of climate policy plummeted.
With scientists again highlighting the need for policy changes and the Paris Climate Conference coming up at the
end of 2015, climate change is again climbing the media and political agendas. And in countries like the UK and
Denmark, where there will be general elections next year, this means that there is a possibility that international
climate politics will connect with domestic politics once again. The stakes of party politics are, as always, high, and
the positions that parties take will influence government policy, public opinion and patterns of party competition.
The Climate Policy and Political Parties project is hosting a one-day workshop on the theme The politics of climate
change. Parties, elections and climate leadership on Friday 30 January 2015 at Friends House in Euston, London,
with the participation of policymakers and researchers. For more information, or if you would like to attend, contact
us at contact[at]climatepolitics.eu.
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